Cramer’s 25 Trading Rules
Rule 1: Bulls, Bears Make Money, Pigs Get Slaughtered
It's essential for all traders to know when to take some off the table. More
Rule 2: It's OK to Pay the Taxes
Stop fearing the tax man and start fearing the loss man because gains can be fleeting. More
Rule 3: Don't Buy All at Once
To maximize your profits, stage your buys, work your orders and try to get the best price over time. More
Rule 4: Buy Damaged Stocks, Not Damaged Companies
There are no refunds on Wall Street, so do your research and focus your trades on damaged stocks rather than companies. More
Rule 5: Diversify to Control Risk
If you control the downside and diversify your holdings, the upside will take care of itself. More
Rule 6: Do Your Stock Homework
Before you buy any stock, it's important to research all aspects of the company. More
Rule 7: No One Made a Dime by Panicking
There will always be a better time to leave the table, so it is best to avoid the fleeing masses. More
Rule 8: Buy Best-of-Breed Companies
Investing in the more expensive stock is invariably worth it because you get piece of mind. More
Rule 9: Defend Some Stocks, Not All
When trading gets tough, pick your favorite stocks and defend only those. More
Rule 10: Bad Buys Won't Become Takeovers
Bad companies never get bids, so it's the good fundamentals you need to focus on. More
Rule 11: Don't Own Too Many Names
It can be constraining, but it's better to have a few positions you know well and like. More
Rule 12: Cash Is for Winners
If you don't like the market or have anything compelling to buy, it's never wrong to go with cash. More
Rule 13: No Woulda, Shoulda, Couldas
This damaging emotion is destructive to the positive mindset needed to make investment decisions. More
Rule 14: Expect, Don't Fear Corrections
It is not always clear when a correction will strike, so expect and be prepared for one at all times. More
Rule 15: Don't Forget Bonds
It's important to watch more than stocks, and bonds are stocks' direct competition. More
Rule 16: Never Subsidize Losers With Winners
Any trader stuck in this position would do well to sell sinking stocks and wait a day. More
Rule 17: Check Hope at the Door
Hope is emotion, pure and simple, and trading is not a game of emotion. More
Rule 18: Be Flexible
Recognize and be open to the unexpected shifts in the market because business, by nature, is dynamic, not static. More
Rule 19: When the Chiefs Retreat, So Should You
High-level executives don't quit a company for personal reasons, so that is a sign something is wrong. More
Rule 20: Giving Up on Value Is a Sin
If you don't have patience, think about letting someone who does run your money. More
Rule 21: Be a TV Critic
Accept that what you hear on television is probably right, but no more than that. More
Rule 22: Wait 30 Days After Preannouncements
Preannouncements signal ongoing weakness, wait 30 days to see if anything has gotten better before you pull the trigger to buy. More
Rule 23: Beware of Wall Street Hype
Never underestimate the promotion machine because analysts get behind stocks and can keep them propelled in an up direction well beyond reason. More
Rule 24: Explain Your Picks
Buying stocks is a solitary event, too solitary in fact, so always make sure you can articulate your reasoning to someone else. More
Rule 25: There's Always a Bull Market
It's OK if you have to work hard to find it, just don't default to what's in bear mode because you are time-constrained or intellectually lazy. More
Friday, January 14, 2011
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Cramer's 7 Stocks Worth Speculating On
Qualcomm's [QCOM 52.07 
In the wake of this deal, many investors are betting on companies that could be taken out. Cramer highlighted seven companies that not only have potential to be acquired, but sport sound fundamentals that give them upside potential:
Acme Packet [APKT 60.23
Netgear [NTGR 36.40
Cirrus Logic [CRUS 18.19
Motricity [MOTR 20.52
Akamai [AKAM 48.75
NVIDIA [NVDA 20.31
ARM Holdings [ARMH 23.41
Cramer's F.A.D.S. C.A.N.
Cramer: 7 Stocks the Hedge Funds Will Be After
Published: Tuesday, 23 Nov 2010 | 7:12 PM ET Text Size
By: Drew Sandholm
Despite stocks ending sharply lower Tuesday, Cramer told investors not to give up. After all, he said the mechanics of this market are on your side.
As we head into the final six weeks of the year, the S&P 500 index remains up 6 percent year-to-date and the fundamentals remain strong. Typically, hedge fund managers would lock in gains by taking profits at the end of the year. This year, however, many money managers are trailing the gains because they were more focused on macro-economic concerns than how individual companies were performing. Desperate to close the performance gap versus the averages, they are piling into momentum names with high-growth, like Cramer's F.A.D.S. C.A.N.:
F5 Networks [FFIV 142.65 -0.04 (-0.03%)
Apple [AAPL 341.64 -0.815 (-0.24%)
Deckers [DECK 79.06 -1.38 (-1.72%)
Salesforce.com [CRM 141.12 -1.52 (-1.07%)
Chipotle [CMG 220.79 -2.88 (-1.29%)
Amazon.com [AMZN 184.34 -0.34 (-0.18%)
Netflix [NFLX 186.65 -1.23 (-0.65%)
Since Nov. 2, the F.A.D.S. C.A.N. stocks are up an average of 11 percent versus a 1 percent decline in the S&P over the same period. Despite the bad tape on Tuesday, DECK, CRM and CMG all hit 52-week highs.
"With so many money managers lagging the benchmarks because they didn't manage their portfolios well, the big boys are going to have to chase momentum going into the end of the year," Cramer said. "That's one more reason to buy the F.A.D.S. C.A.N. names."
[转贴] 散户为何挣不到钱的五大原因
[转贴] 散户为何挣不到钱的五大原因
| 第一，为什么散户总是输多赢少？ 散户之所以涨的时候赚的钱不够亏的时候赔的钱，主要是因为在涨升阶段换股频繁喜欢狙击短线，结果赚下来都是一小段一小段的利润；而市场往往在完成涨升阶段后下跌都是陡峭的角度杀盘，几天就可以把一个月赚的赔光。而且散户十个中九个赔，但没有人想到他就是那一个，所有人都将自己“合理的自大”，算在赚钱的 10%之中，当然也没有人想过为什么股票的钱这么难赚；投资选股是在和拥有庞大资金实力与调研研究人员的机构抗衡，与出其不意的政策抗衡，与群众的非理性的情绪抗衡，同时自己内心也在天人交战，还要承担看似不多累计起来吓人的交易成本。散户并不拥有那么多行业的专业知识，能够看清行业发展的未来，更多依赖不稳定的技术分析系统和盘口表现做出决策，本身就居于投资领域竞争的弱势，只有超级大牛市市场出现整体机会时散户才有赚钱机会，而这种机会仅占股市发展过程中15%，可惜散户把任何阶段都当成大牛市来操作对待，能长期赚钱真是奇迹。 第二，散户为什么会频繁交易 因为每个人都认为下一笔交易是难得一见的神奇交易，可以赚一整年，就是所谓的“大金刚效应”大金刚从荣耀的巅峰下摔死一样，很多人常常在赔掉一切后结束交易。很多投资者天天选股，深怕错过每一笔神奇的交易，结果会引起不断的期盼和频繁交易，而忽略资金控管的重要性，只知道整天研究“决策”，花大半的时间在 “决策”要买哪只股票，但真正赚钱的部分不是选股，而是资金管理。如何在买入一只股票后决定出场点和时机，大多数投资者没有计划，结果大部分出场点都是赔到痛才出场，有时连之前赚的都看不见了。对于在上升趋势的股票投资者又不愿意花时间等待，每天市场都有热点和亮点，新热点起来时盯盘的投资者又耳热心跳忍不住不去操作，结果手上的持股还没有走完又转战到不熟悉的领域，以选股为重心的操作往往就会导致频繁交易。股价总是震荡上行的，大家都总是想赚到所有的波段，没有人那么厉害，再涨也不会一路涨上去买不到，有涨得稳的，有涨得慢的，但投资者心态总是随着正常的波动反复改变。回调和下跌是两回事，绝大多数区别不了，如果区别不了其中的差异，永远做不好股票。 第三，散户为什么不愿意停损？ 人的心态永远都是回避风险的，总认为发生了亏损可以不必理会，而且还不断地往下看支撑，这是和大多数人只能想像和接受有利于自己的事物，不善于接受不利于自己的环境有关。物质社会让人心态失衡，最关键的一点就是大家都看到“得到”的“好处”，而不能接受“失去”的“坏处”。对停损的重要性往往估计不足。其实下跌浪发生了找支撑是件吃力不讨好的事情，因为下跌的速度往往会比上涨的速度大3倍！恐惧比乐观还要危险，何况底部确认不易，越聪明的人越会犹豫，人们总是打心底以为无视风险就等于逃开了风险，不善停损的人往往缺乏自律精神，都是不愿意尊重负面因素，就像酒鬼不愿意承认自己酗酒，高估自己在酒精诱惑下的自控能力一样，投资者往往会低估了结损失带来的灾难。一旦发现损失总是希望反弹回来自己的本钱，但亏损本身已经实际发生了，再发展下去就是更大的亏损—— 2007年买入银行股的投资者最终套牢两年不得解套，而1997年买入四川长虹不愿意停损的投资已经套牢14年！更为遗憾的是不愿停损的投资最终扛不住市场强大的趋势压力，往往会在惨赔了50%甚至更多的时候结束这痛苦的一切，接下来会在心理失衡的状态下继续更加糟糕的投资，有的甚至再难重新振作回到市场，反而会走向另外一个极端——稍有盈利立马结算，陷入我们所说的第二个频繁交易的陷阱里去。所以不会停损，不执行停损带来的冲击不仅仅是金钱上的损失，还有一股更大的习惯势力将自己远远拉离成功的道路。 第四，散户为什么赚不到大波段翻倍的钱？ 每个投资者在交易开始之初都是怀抱美好的愿望，认为买进的股票可以大赚一年，翻一倍甚至N倍，即使持有的股票应声上涨了也很少有人能够赚到股票成倍上涨的钱。我们做过一个统计，在多年的数据和客户跟踪中我们了解到当股票上涨幅度超过20%时，兑现的压力往往就快速出现了；当股票上涨到50%时，股票中持有的散户基本被清理出场了。当然在震荡市中压缩利润空间是很正常的，但即使在中国一个股票要做到翻倍最快也要9个月的时间，在成熟市场最快也是两年到三年。几乎没有人愿意花一年甚至两年的时间无所事事；更重要的是散户每天都在计算自己赚了多少钱，而不是以证券资产的形式管理自己的财富，不是将资产放在最妥当的公司身上获取利益，每天都要将股票折算成现金的方式有个坏作用，一旦发现股价波动市值稍有缩水就急于结算，结果和大牛股擦肩而过； 第五，为什么散户承受的心理压力比机构大？ 散户承受的心理压力往往比机构大很多，我接触过很多成功的基金、券商资产管理公司的老总，即使在最熊的市场里，他们依然是歌舞升平马照跑舞照跳酒照喝。不是因为他们管理的不是自己的钱，而是他们对配置的公司里里外外都非常了解，本身在信息和判断上就研究得很透；每个成功的管理人后面都有风控组把持，出现状况风控组可以按程序执行不需要内心太多的纠结。但最关键的两点：成功的管理人把投资失误看成是资金管理中必不可少的环节，特别是不受到配置股票限制的私募基金管理人，对资产配置的研究超过对买卖时机的研究，接受和承认自己可能发生的错误，努力将失误的代价控制在最少的范围内；另外一点就是当利润走势有利于他们时，他们的持股可以放很长很长时间让利润奔跑，每个成功的资金管理人都明白一个道理：这是他一辈子的事业。而散户总是梦想这几个月发一次大财，还有一笔钱用来装修房子或出国旅游——如果投资不是你将要从事20年的事业，那么自然就会把20年累计的压力放在2个月来承受，这样的心理压力下要想投的对，投得准，但愿老天开眼吧。 |
Monday, October 20, 2008
股市操作中的17种通病
发信人: skyway (路过), 信区: Stock标 题: 股市操作中的17种通病(zz)发信站: The unknown SPACE (Sat Jun 28 01:27:56 2003) WWW-POST
股市操作中的17种通病
在股市中，由于利益驱动特别强烈，因此，几乎每时每刻都有人在犯错误。“错误是伟大的导师，要使自己变得聪明，就必须向错误和挫折学习”。尽管股市没有记忆，同类的错误总是不断地沉渣泛起，让人一犯再犯。弄清股市操作的通病，经常以此为镜，也是走向成功的阶梯。
根据多年来股市正反两方面的经验、教训和笔者的切身体会，特将股市操作错误的通病解剖如下：
1、忽视震荡箱
许多人仅根据宏观经济面向好，就一厢情愿地指望股市一涨再涨，而忽视了扩容的压力和政策调控，淡化了箱型观念。以上海股市为例，实际上每年都有一个缓慢上移的震荡箱。如1995年是600-800点，1996年是800-1050点，1997年是1050-1250点，1998年是1200-1400点，若看不到每年箱型震荡的箱底和箱顶，就必然会在箱底空仓而踏空，在箱顶满仓而全线被套，把半年乃至一年的成果悉数揩光。
2、控制不好不同波段位置的仓位
在人气极旺的时候，许多新股民就迫不及待地入场，小赢了几次后，就自我感觉良好，迅速作出满仓决定，生怕资金搁着浪费了利息，而不仔细研判大盘是处于波段底部，还是中部，或是顶部，以致先赢后输。即使是一些老股民，包括机构，也往往因为对形势、政策、供求判断不准，在缩量的波段底部，人气散淡时恐惧杀跌轻仓，在放量的波段中部，人气恢复时从众建大半仓，而在放巨量的波段顶部、人气鼎沸时贪婪，追涨满仓。
3、热衷于做小差价而告别“黑马”
当大盘或个股经三大浪下跌见底后，主力为了拣回低价筹码，往往会反复震荡筑底，甚至将股价“打回老家去”。此时，许多人往往心态“抖忽”，将抄底筹码在赚到几角钱小差价后就拱手相让，套牢者见股价出现反弹，便忙不迭地割肉。指望再到下面去补回来。岂知，主力往往在底部采取连拉小阳，或单兵刺探再缩回的手法建仓，将底部筹码一网打尽后，便一路拔高，甚至创出新高，使“丑小鸭”演变成“小天鹅”。很多人就是因为贪图小差价而痛失底部筹码，甚至在走出底部时割肉，酿成了与“黑马”失之交臂的悲剧。
4、急于抢反弹而被深度套牢
股市中有时会出现一种连续几十个交易日单边上升后的“缓上急落”波段，指数或个股在急落时往往跌势猛、幅度深，主力不顾一切地杀跌，兑现获利盘。许多看不懂这种凶险走势的人，往往在见顶后的第一根“大黑棒”时就去抢反弹，好比是在半空中用手去接从高空掉落的一把尖刀那样地不合时宜，结果十有九套。随后就采用摊平法，越跌越买，在下跌第一波中就耗尽了资金，以致眼睁睁地看着下跌第二波、第三波的发生，直至底部时也无法动弹，陷入极其被动的境地。
5、不善于在上升左半球冲顶时分批了结
多数人在大盘个股处于顶部区时总是对市场利好有较高的预期，受旺盛人气的干扰比较大，对指数和个股的创新高的期望值过高，急于扩大战果，以求暴利。因此，明明顶部区域特征明显，也不甘心于在上升左半球时分批了结；而到了见顶回落后，在下跌右半球之初，明明盈利已在减少，仍不忍心下手了结，乃至顶部反抽时又异想天开能“再创新高”，以致再次贻误了平仓出局、落袋为安的良机，导致顶部套牢。
6、患得患失，不愿及时止损
多数人买进股票后，抱着“非赚不卖”的念头，心往一处(上涨)想，劲往一处(上涨)使，而害怕想“亏损了怎么办”的问题，以致于指数或个股从顶部下跌5—7%时，仍死捂不放，执迷不悟，不甘心割肉认赔。哪怕指数、个股一跌再跌，也迟迟不愿作出反应，直到人气出现恐慌，损失扩大到难以承受的地步，才如梦初醒地杀跌出局。而此时，股价往往已接底部，割肉不久，股价便出现了大涨。
7、在反弹时用全部资金押在一只股票上，孤注一掷
有的人在底部踏空，心态很坏。当大盘反弹到中位时，便手忙脚乱，急于凭印象补仓，全线买进在整轮跌势中不跌反涨的高价强势股，试图赌一下。谁知，刚买进，大盘反弹就夭折，所买的个股跳水更厉害，“整筐鸡蛋”全都被打碎。若适当分仓，买3—5只股票，还有获利个股与亏损个股对冲之机会。
8、在涨至波段中位时，不善于高抛低吸
通常从波段底部涨到中部，主力总会进行震荡洗盘，甚至筑双底，以提高市场平均持股成本，并降低自己的持股成本。很多人只看到放量后必上涨这种可能性，而看不到放量后回头的可能性，以致明明有较大的获利，顷刻化为乌有，甚至变成套牢。意志不坚者误以为反弹结束，便割肉出局，谁知稍后又涨了；先期在中部未抛出的人见股价又上来了，便吸取教训，及时“高抛”。谁知，这次股价真的上去了，遂造成了踏空“黑马”的错误。
9、只想赢大利，而看不上“小利”
许多人总是铭记着1996、1997年大牛市时指数上涨36%的辉煌历史，垂涎别人的成功，以此套用到震荡市、箱型市、平衡市、牛皮市、乃至弱市的盈利期望值，面对着一两天内就获利10%，面对涨停板，贪欲遂起，不肯将获利成果全部“拿下”，或“部分拿下”。岂知，此乃“脉冲”行情而已，次日便一路下挫，机会错失，由帐面盈利变成了实际亏损。在股市中，不善于在资金卡上做“小加法”的人，是不可能在资金卡上做“大加法”的。
10、迷信股评家、咨询公司和机构测市的观点来研判大势
许多人总以为自己资金量小、经验不足、人轻言微，把握不了大势，遂将对大势的判断权交给了股评家、咨询公司和机构测市的栏目。其实，这往往是错误的。 须知，股评家和机构发言人也都是人，也有人性的弱点，也有思想上的片面性，也有利益驱动(有的本身就代表了主力、庄家的做多或做空的意图)。这些人往往在技术指数处于底部，均线呈空头发散式排列、成交量极度萎缩、人气低迷时看空，称“还要探底”；在技术指标处于顶部、均线呈多头发散式排列、成交量放巨量甚至天量，人气鼎沸时看多，称“还要创新高”。这种机械的技术分析和“金玉良言”往往是市场走势滞后的反映，主力正好与此反做。不然，机构在底部怎么拣得到割肉筹码，在顶部将筹码去抛给谁？对于这种历史上曾一再发生的情况，若盲目跟从，追涨杀跌，便会蒙受重大损失。当然，也有这样的情况，股评家、咨询公司和机构在犯错后，根据新情况而及时修正了观点，而大众并不知道。因此，对“迷信”者而言，丧失了“主权”，就等于把自己的资金的“生杀”大权置于一种十分危险的境地。
11、以旧观念、老经验来选股，吃不透每年的热点变化
股市热点年年岁岁均不同，无不是与当年的经济、金融形势和上市新股的主流品种和价格定位相关。如1998年的市场热点是“低价股、重组股”，但很多人仍按照1996—1997年的热点来选股，严重脱离现实，按旧思路买进长虹、发展、春兰等绩优股，而抵制资产重组行情，反而亏了钱。
12、选股时受“强者恒强，弱者恒弱”的形而上学的误导
股票与世界上任何事物一样，没有“恒强”或“恒弱”的状态。 但主力、庄家往往在顶部或次顶部时鼓吹“强者恒强、弱者恒弱”的口号，以便扩大个股的盈利，打开上行空间，在高位尽可能多地把筹码倒给跟风的中小散户，然后在震荡、压低、杀跌中，利用人们抢反弹的心理，乘机出逃获利筹码。 而在底部或次底部时，往往鼓吹“弱者恒弱”的口号，目的是引发大户、中小散户割肉盘涌出，打开下跌空间。为此，他们总是在大盘上涨时，肆意打压某强势股；在大盘下跌时，再狂炸某弱势股，使人们对此彻底丧失信心，主力却不动声色地建仓，再拉高台阶横扫割肉盘，以便培育出未来的“黑马”。而许多人所犯的错误，正是在顶部时，与“恒强”的“黑马”“握手”，追涨吃套；而在底部时，与“恒弱”的潜在“黑马”“告别”，岂有不输之理！
13、靠打听“绝密消息”和别人的推荐来选股，结果屡屡“吃药”
很多人原先凭自己的独立研判来选股，虽然难以捕捉到“黑马”，但也有不同程度的获利。后来感到这样做资本增长太慢，不如凭消息或报刊推荐见效快，于是就改弦易辙，开始注重打包票的“绝密消息”或报刊上的信息，果然也成功了几次，便视为灵丹妙药，不再花功夫研究公司基本面、股价走势和所处位置。即使明明已在顶部满仓，但得到“绝密消息”后，马上重仓介入一只“黑马”股。岂知，主力见跟风者一多，就震仓洗盘，并因大盘走软而改为往下拔档，听消息者便被深度套牢。其实，从总体而言，股市中所谓的“绝密消息”既然能广为流传，就已谈不上绝密，往往是“药头”，被证明是错的。即使最终被证实是对的，股价也往往已提前到位。因此，有一句股市谚语说得很对：“内部消息多的人反被消息误”。
14、不敢买无量创新低或无量创新高的股票
在连续跌势后，多数投资者熊市思维严重，对那些业绩不错或有资产重组题材的个股仍抱着传统的偏见；有的个股在底部横盘一段时间后，明明是主力炸盘，无量假破底，却吓得不敢买，生怕还要跌；而有的个股连续走高，并在无量创新高时，更不敢追涨，生怕被套牢，结果失去了一段大涨行情。其实，无量破底或无量创新高，都说明筹码大多数集中在主力手里，后市定有大行情。对付它的最好办法是，趁回档缩量时适量介入。
15、只敢买名气大的股票，而不考虑盘子大小、股本扩张能力和成长性
有些人买股票就像买保险，认为凡名气很大的股票，既说明以往赚钱的人多，也说明这家公司可靠，保险系数高。正因为如此，1998年年初很多中小投资者专买长虹、海尔、深发展等名牌股，而忽视了如今这些股票价格高、盘子大、股本扩张能力差等缺点，结果接了最后一棒，成为以往获取暴利的中长线买家撤退的垫脚石。 看似最安全的股票，往往是风险最大的股票，所受的损失大大超过了指数下跌的幅度。而1998年股市的市况却是，以往几年中名气最坏、受损最多、业绩最差的股票，借助于资产重组而群体“升天”，远远跑赢了大盘。
16、挂单时分分计较，以致错失抄底逃顶、获利避险的良机
由于在底部区域买进时，双方撮合的机会较小，很多人看到盘中显示超过自己报出的价位，便以为成交。次日才发觉并未成交，然股价早已面目全非，就不敢再作行动，以致失去了大的获利机会，或导致亏损加重。其实，既是底部买进，就应提高几分钱确保成交。既然是在顶部卖出，就应压低几分钱强行成交。这样做，实际成交价往往比你所报的价更令人满意。
17、见利好追涨，见利空杀跌
许多人把实事求是的原则机械地搬用到股市，将利好和利空消息都作为“实事求是”来理解并加以贯彻，结果屡屡上当被套。殊不知，个股的利多和利空在市场往往呈现相反效应。上市公司业绩大幅增长、大比例送股的利好消息公布之日，却不涨反跌，常常拉出放量长黑，主力乘机出货，跟进者十有九套。而上市公司业绩下降、送股“泡汤”，甚至亏损的利空消息公布之日，却不跌反涨，并放量拉出长红，主力乘坏消息进货，杀跌者十有九踏空。主要原因是信息披露不规范，数月前已走漏风声，被主力获取，在股价走势中早已提前反映，以致消息正式出台后，走势便出现逆反。“不是股价跟着业绩和方案走，而是业绩和方案跟着股价走”，不知原委的投资者屡屡被利多或利空消息的相反效应弄得晕头转向。 （来源：硬度的主页）
股市操作中的17种通病
在股市中，由于利益驱动特别强烈，因此，几乎每时每刻都有人在犯错误。“错误是伟大的导师，要使自己变得聪明，就必须向错误和挫折学习”。尽管股市没有记忆，同类的错误总是不断地沉渣泛起，让人一犯再犯。弄清股市操作的通病，经常以此为镜，也是走向成功的阶梯。
根据多年来股市正反两方面的经验、教训和笔者的切身体会，特将股市操作错误的通病解剖如下：
1、忽视震荡箱
许多人仅根据宏观经济面向好，就一厢情愿地指望股市一涨再涨，而忽视了扩容的压力和政策调控，淡化了箱型观念。以上海股市为例，实际上每年都有一个缓慢上移的震荡箱。如1995年是600-800点，1996年是800-1050点，1997年是1050-1250点，1998年是1200-1400点，若看不到每年箱型震荡的箱底和箱顶，就必然会在箱底空仓而踏空，在箱顶满仓而全线被套，把半年乃至一年的成果悉数揩光。
2、控制不好不同波段位置的仓位
在人气极旺的时候，许多新股民就迫不及待地入场，小赢了几次后，就自我感觉良好，迅速作出满仓决定，生怕资金搁着浪费了利息，而不仔细研判大盘是处于波段底部，还是中部，或是顶部，以致先赢后输。即使是一些老股民，包括机构，也往往因为对形势、政策、供求判断不准，在缩量的波段底部，人气散淡时恐惧杀跌轻仓，在放量的波段中部，人气恢复时从众建大半仓，而在放巨量的波段顶部、人气鼎沸时贪婪，追涨满仓。
3、热衷于做小差价而告别“黑马”
当大盘或个股经三大浪下跌见底后，主力为了拣回低价筹码，往往会反复震荡筑底，甚至将股价“打回老家去”。此时，许多人往往心态“抖忽”，将抄底筹码在赚到几角钱小差价后就拱手相让，套牢者见股价出现反弹，便忙不迭地割肉。指望再到下面去补回来。岂知，主力往往在底部采取连拉小阳，或单兵刺探再缩回的手法建仓，将底部筹码一网打尽后，便一路拔高，甚至创出新高，使“丑小鸭”演变成“小天鹅”。很多人就是因为贪图小差价而痛失底部筹码，甚至在走出底部时割肉，酿成了与“黑马”失之交臂的悲剧。
4、急于抢反弹而被深度套牢
股市中有时会出现一种连续几十个交易日单边上升后的“缓上急落”波段，指数或个股在急落时往往跌势猛、幅度深，主力不顾一切地杀跌，兑现获利盘。许多看不懂这种凶险走势的人，往往在见顶后的第一根“大黑棒”时就去抢反弹，好比是在半空中用手去接从高空掉落的一把尖刀那样地不合时宜，结果十有九套。随后就采用摊平法，越跌越买，在下跌第一波中就耗尽了资金，以致眼睁睁地看着下跌第二波、第三波的发生，直至底部时也无法动弹，陷入极其被动的境地。
5、不善于在上升左半球冲顶时分批了结
多数人在大盘个股处于顶部区时总是对市场利好有较高的预期，受旺盛人气的干扰比较大，对指数和个股的创新高的期望值过高，急于扩大战果，以求暴利。因此，明明顶部区域特征明显，也不甘心于在上升左半球时分批了结；而到了见顶回落后，在下跌右半球之初，明明盈利已在减少，仍不忍心下手了结，乃至顶部反抽时又异想天开能“再创新高”，以致再次贻误了平仓出局、落袋为安的良机，导致顶部套牢。
6、患得患失，不愿及时止损
多数人买进股票后，抱着“非赚不卖”的念头，心往一处(上涨)想，劲往一处(上涨)使，而害怕想“亏损了怎么办”的问题，以致于指数或个股从顶部下跌5—7%时，仍死捂不放，执迷不悟，不甘心割肉认赔。哪怕指数、个股一跌再跌，也迟迟不愿作出反应，直到人气出现恐慌，损失扩大到难以承受的地步，才如梦初醒地杀跌出局。而此时，股价往往已接底部，割肉不久，股价便出现了大涨。
7、在反弹时用全部资金押在一只股票上，孤注一掷
有的人在底部踏空，心态很坏。当大盘反弹到中位时，便手忙脚乱，急于凭印象补仓，全线买进在整轮跌势中不跌反涨的高价强势股，试图赌一下。谁知，刚买进，大盘反弹就夭折，所买的个股跳水更厉害，“整筐鸡蛋”全都被打碎。若适当分仓，买3—5只股票，还有获利个股与亏损个股对冲之机会。
8、在涨至波段中位时，不善于高抛低吸
通常从波段底部涨到中部，主力总会进行震荡洗盘，甚至筑双底，以提高市场平均持股成本，并降低自己的持股成本。很多人只看到放量后必上涨这种可能性，而看不到放量后回头的可能性，以致明明有较大的获利，顷刻化为乌有，甚至变成套牢。意志不坚者误以为反弹结束，便割肉出局，谁知稍后又涨了；先期在中部未抛出的人见股价又上来了，便吸取教训，及时“高抛”。谁知，这次股价真的上去了，遂造成了踏空“黑马”的错误。
9、只想赢大利，而看不上“小利”
许多人总是铭记着1996、1997年大牛市时指数上涨36%的辉煌历史，垂涎别人的成功，以此套用到震荡市、箱型市、平衡市、牛皮市、乃至弱市的盈利期望值，面对着一两天内就获利10%，面对涨停板，贪欲遂起，不肯将获利成果全部“拿下”，或“部分拿下”。岂知，此乃“脉冲”行情而已，次日便一路下挫，机会错失，由帐面盈利变成了实际亏损。在股市中，不善于在资金卡上做“小加法”的人，是不可能在资金卡上做“大加法”的。
10、迷信股评家、咨询公司和机构测市的观点来研判大势
许多人总以为自己资金量小、经验不足、人轻言微，把握不了大势，遂将对大势的判断权交给了股评家、咨询公司和机构测市的栏目。其实，这往往是错误的。 须知，股评家和机构发言人也都是人，也有人性的弱点，也有思想上的片面性，也有利益驱动(有的本身就代表了主力、庄家的做多或做空的意图)。这些人往往在技术指数处于底部，均线呈空头发散式排列、成交量极度萎缩、人气低迷时看空，称“还要探底”；在技术指标处于顶部、均线呈多头发散式排列、成交量放巨量甚至天量，人气鼎沸时看多，称“还要创新高”。这种机械的技术分析和“金玉良言”往往是市场走势滞后的反映，主力正好与此反做。不然，机构在底部怎么拣得到割肉筹码，在顶部将筹码去抛给谁？对于这种历史上曾一再发生的情况，若盲目跟从，追涨杀跌，便会蒙受重大损失。当然，也有这样的情况，股评家、咨询公司和机构在犯错后，根据新情况而及时修正了观点，而大众并不知道。因此，对“迷信”者而言，丧失了“主权”，就等于把自己的资金的“生杀”大权置于一种十分危险的境地。
11、以旧观念、老经验来选股，吃不透每年的热点变化
股市热点年年岁岁均不同，无不是与当年的经济、金融形势和上市新股的主流品种和价格定位相关。如1998年的市场热点是“低价股、重组股”，但很多人仍按照1996—1997年的热点来选股，严重脱离现实，按旧思路买进长虹、发展、春兰等绩优股，而抵制资产重组行情，反而亏了钱。
12、选股时受“强者恒强，弱者恒弱”的形而上学的误导
股票与世界上任何事物一样，没有“恒强”或“恒弱”的状态。 但主力、庄家往往在顶部或次顶部时鼓吹“强者恒强、弱者恒弱”的口号，以便扩大个股的盈利，打开上行空间，在高位尽可能多地把筹码倒给跟风的中小散户，然后在震荡、压低、杀跌中，利用人们抢反弹的心理，乘机出逃获利筹码。 而在底部或次底部时，往往鼓吹“弱者恒弱”的口号，目的是引发大户、中小散户割肉盘涌出，打开下跌空间。为此，他们总是在大盘上涨时，肆意打压某强势股；在大盘下跌时，再狂炸某弱势股，使人们对此彻底丧失信心，主力却不动声色地建仓，再拉高台阶横扫割肉盘，以便培育出未来的“黑马”。而许多人所犯的错误，正是在顶部时，与“恒强”的“黑马”“握手”，追涨吃套；而在底部时，与“恒弱”的潜在“黑马”“告别”，岂有不输之理！
13、靠打听“绝密消息”和别人的推荐来选股，结果屡屡“吃药”
很多人原先凭自己的独立研判来选股，虽然难以捕捉到“黑马”，但也有不同程度的获利。后来感到这样做资本增长太慢，不如凭消息或报刊推荐见效快，于是就改弦易辙，开始注重打包票的“绝密消息”或报刊上的信息，果然也成功了几次，便视为灵丹妙药，不再花功夫研究公司基本面、股价走势和所处位置。即使明明已在顶部满仓，但得到“绝密消息”后，马上重仓介入一只“黑马”股。岂知，主力见跟风者一多，就震仓洗盘，并因大盘走软而改为往下拔档，听消息者便被深度套牢。其实，从总体而言，股市中所谓的“绝密消息”既然能广为流传，就已谈不上绝密，往往是“药头”，被证明是错的。即使最终被证实是对的，股价也往往已提前到位。因此，有一句股市谚语说得很对：“内部消息多的人反被消息误”。
14、不敢买无量创新低或无量创新高的股票
在连续跌势后，多数投资者熊市思维严重，对那些业绩不错或有资产重组题材的个股仍抱着传统的偏见；有的个股在底部横盘一段时间后，明明是主力炸盘，无量假破底，却吓得不敢买，生怕还要跌；而有的个股连续走高，并在无量创新高时，更不敢追涨，生怕被套牢，结果失去了一段大涨行情。其实，无量破底或无量创新高，都说明筹码大多数集中在主力手里，后市定有大行情。对付它的最好办法是，趁回档缩量时适量介入。
15、只敢买名气大的股票，而不考虑盘子大小、股本扩张能力和成长性
有些人买股票就像买保险，认为凡名气很大的股票，既说明以往赚钱的人多，也说明这家公司可靠，保险系数高。正因为如此，1998年年初很多中小投资者专买长虹、海尔、深发展等名牌股，而忽视了如今这些股票价格高、盘子大、股本扩张能力差等缺点，结果接了最后一棒，成为以往获取暴利的中长线买家撤退的垫脚石。 看似最安全的股票，往往是风险最大的股票，所受的损失大大超过了指数下跌的幅度。而1998年股市的市况却是，以往几年中名气最坏、受损最多、业绩最差的股票，借助于资产重组而群体“升天”，远远跑赢了大盘。
16、挂单时分分计较，以致错失抄底逃顶、获利避险的良机
由于在底部区域买进时，双方撮合的机会较小，很多人看到盘中显示超过自己报出的价位，便以为成交。次日才发觉并未成交，然股价早已面目全非，就不敢再作行动，以致失去了大的获利机会，或导致亏损加重。其实，既是底部买进，就应提高几分钱确保成交。既然是在顶部卖出，就应压低几分钱强行成交。这样做，实际成交价往往比你所报的价更令人满意。
17、见利好追涨，见利空杀跌
许多人把实事求是的原则机械地搬用到股市，将利好和利空消息都作为“实事求是”来理解并加以贯彻，结果屡屡上当被套。殊不知，个股的利多和利空在市场往往呈现相反效应。上市公司业绩大幅增长、大比例送股的利好消息公布之日，却不涨反跌，常常拉出放量长黑，主力乘机出货，跟进者十有九套。而上市公司业绩下降、送股“泡汤”，甚至亏损的利空消息公布之日，却不跌反涨，并放量拉出长红，主力乘坏消息进货，杀跌者十有九踏空。主要原因是信息披露不规范，数月前已走漏风声，被主力获取，在股价走势中早已提前反映，以致消息正式出台后，走势便出现逆反。“不是股价跟着业绩和方案走，而是业绩和方案跟着股价走”，不知原委的投资者屡屡被利多或利空消息的相反效应弄得晕头转向。 （来源：硬度的主页）
Thursday, June 12, 2008
Seth Klarman Comments on Money Management and Baupost's Approach
A friend sent me a video of a speech given by Seth Klarman at the Columbia Business School in 2006. Klarman’s hedge fund the Baupost Group has done over 20% a year since he founded the firm in 1983, with only one down year. Also, Seth Klarman’s book Margin of Safety: Risk-Averse Value Investing Strategies for the Thoughtful Investor is one of the best books I’ve read on value investing. It’s currently out of print and selling for about $1,600, but I got a copy through my library’s intra-library loan program.Of all the articles/speeches/interviews of value investment managers this is one of the best speeches I’ve ever watched. Klarman discusses how he made over 5 times his money investing in Enron debt, what his investment principles are, his thoughts on the investment manegment industry, why he doesn't go short and why he uses derivitives.This speech is not posted anywhere else on the internet.
Here is my summary:Thoughts on the Investment Management Industry
The investment management industry is not set up to achieve market beating returns. Instead they are incentivized to get big and act like asset gatherers. At the same time there is little incentive to take risk and deviate from the mean because if they strike out and underperform for even a short period clients will be lost quickly. It’s an enforced mediocrity (if you want to get big just do what everyone else is doing and settle for average results).
Klarman said he would rather hold treasury bills then invest in many of the hedge funds out there. If stocks do 10% going forward and a hedge fund that charges 2 and 20 takes 3% of your money in fees you’ve only got 7% left, plus it’s leveraged, holds illiquid securities, etc. He would much rather get 4.5% risk free.
Tweedy Brown is today’s manifestation of Benjamin Graham
Value investing is risk aversion
Baupost charges a 1 percent management fee plus 20 percent of profits.
How Baupost Invests
Rule #1: Don’t lose money. Rule #2: Never forgot Rule #1.
Baupost always looks for catalysts in its investments. If you find a stock trading for 50% of what you think it’s worth you want there to be something that will trigger it to reach fair value.
Baupost will always sell an investment as soon as it near their estimate of fair value. Baupost has analysts focused around the type of opportunity; Baupost has a spinoff analyst, index fund deletion analyst, post bankruptcy analyst, distressed debt analyst and an analyst looking at companies that are depressed because of a bad earnings announcement).
Baupost invest in: Both public and private distressed debt, Real estate (Baupost has done over 200 real estate deals including biding on RTC auctions), U.S. and foreign equities, LBO’s and Derivatives.
The portfolio at the time of the talk was 45% cash, 20% equities, around 17% distressed debt, 11% real estate, 7% private investments (distressed debt, small LBO’s, financial restructurings), 6% in South Korean equities and a small % in hedges.
Baupost looks at every merger, rights offering, privatization of government business, spin off, major share repurchase, dutch auction tender, thrift conversions or anything else that could cause mispricings.
Post bankruptcy situations are a good place to look for bargains because people avoid them and don’t understand them. A lot of good things can happen in bankruptcy such as terminate overpriced contracts or leases, shed extraneous business units or, deal with union problems or settle contingent liabilities; all under the protection of bankruptcy court. Then all the debt holders have equity and they will want to sell.
Baupost opened over 1,000 savings accounts across the country to take advantage of thrift conversions.
Baupost doesn’t go short because, unlike going long when you can take advantage of a drop in the value of an undervalued security by just buying more, if you're short even though you may be right that it’s worth less then the trading price you can still go broke. It’s way more risky and you can lose to infinity. Think tech stocks - if you shorted them in '97, '98 or even '99 you would have been killed. It works for a while, and then the market goes berserk and you get killed.
Baupost uses hedges to reduce risk. For example, they use derivatives to hedge the interest rate risk in their real estate holdings. They hold credit default swaps on the government debt of countries they have investments in (S. Korea). They also hold credit default swaps in a bunch of European countries not necessarily because they have holdings there but because it reduces risk and they were very cheap ($60, 000 a year for $100 million in insurance).
Baupost does best when there is high uncertainty and little information. When they research a company they do what ever they can to find information; they talk to every one to get information including management, industry people, former executives, customers, suppliers, they sometimes hire consultants and talk to analysts on buy and sell side.
They constantly reassess to find new information, if they’ve overlooked something or if something has changed.
Employees own the second largest position in Baupost.
Baupost’s 3 investment principles:
1. Focus on risk before return. This is why Baupost has so much cash, currently 45% of the fund is in cash. If they could find undervalued investments they would put all their money to work tomorrow. If they had to they would have no problem holding 100% cash. People fail to have sell discipline because they can’t hold cash.
2. Focus on absolute returns. Institutions focus on relative returns but Baupost doesn’t because Klarman can’t imagine writing a letter to clients saying "we performed well during the year, the market was down 25% and we were down only 20%" also clients will pull money out at the wrong time and it has a strong psychological effect.
3. Only focus on bottom up investing. He has views on the macro but doesn’t think he has an edge in that type of investing. Klarman said that it’s really hard to turn a macro idea into an investment.
Klarman's 5 fold investment in Enron debt
Baupost invested in Enron’s senior debt and he said that would be an example of his favorite type of investment. The situation had a lot of complexity, hard to analyze, a lot of litigation, uncertainty and no one wanted to be associated with anything Enron creating a huge mispricing. Baupost bought the debt for 10-15 cents on the dollar. It comes down to assessing assets minus liabilities. After a few years most of Enron’s assets were cash $16-18 billion but the liabilities were extremely complicated, with over 1,000 subsidiaries. Baupost had one analyst focus solely on Enron for over 4 years and try to figure out its liabilities and how much they would get back on the bonds. Baupost believed that the people liquidating Enron were low balling what they would get back on the bonds. The people liquidating Enron were very pessimistic and they originally estimated that the bonds would get back 17 cents on the dollar at the same time the debt traded for 14-15 cents, Baupost estimated that the debt would recover 30-40 cents and as of now they believe it will be more then 50 cents.
Investments like Enron debt are possible because the market doesn’t assess risk correctly by relying on volatility (beta).
Here is my summary:Thoughts on the Investment Management Industry
The investment management industry is not set up to achieve market beating returns. Instead they are incentivized to get big and act like asset gatherers. At the same time there is little incentive to take risk and deviate from the mean because if they strike out and underperform for even a short period clients will be lost quickly. It’s an enforced mediocrity (if you want to get big just do what everyone else is doing and settle for average results).
Klarman said he would rather hold treasury bills then invest in many of the hedge funds out there. If stocks do 10% going forward and a hedge fund that charges 2 and 20 takes 3% of your money in fees you’ve only got 7% left, plus it’s leveraged, holds illiquid securities, etc. He would much rather get 4.5% risk free.
Tweedy Brown is today’s manifestation of Benjamin Graham
Value investing is risk aversion
Baupost charges a 1 percent management fee plus 20 percent of profits.
How Baupost Invests
Rule #1: Don’t lose money. Rule #2: Never forgot Rule #1.
Baupost always looks for catalysts in its investments. If you find a stock trading for 50% of what you think it’s worth you want there to be something that will trigger it to reach fair value.
Baupost will always sell an investment as soon as it near their estimate of fair value. Baupost has analysts focused around the type of opportunity; Baupost has a spinoff analyst, index fund deletion analyst, post bankruptcy analyst, distressed debt analyst and an analyst looking at companies that are depressed because of a bad earnings announcement).
Baupost invest in: Both public and private distressed debt, Real estate (Baupost has done over 200 real estate deals including biding on RTC auctions), U.S. and foreign equities, LBO’s and Derivatives.
The portfolio at the time of the talk was 45% cash, 20% equities, around 17% distressed debt, 11% real estate, 7% private investments (distressed debt, small LBO’s, financial restructurings), 6% in South Korean equities and a small % in hedges.
Baupost looks at every merger, rights offering, privatization of government business, spin off, major share repurchase, dutch auction tender, thrift conversions or anything else that could cause mispricings.
Post bankruptcy situations are a good place to look for bargains because people avoid them and don’t understand them. A lot of good things can happen in bankruptcy such as terminate overpriced contracts or leases, shed extraneous business units or, deal with union problems or settle contingent liabilities; all under the protection of bankruptcy court. Then all the debt holders have equity and they will want to sell.
Baupost opened over 1,000 savings accounts across the country to take advantage of thrift conversions.
Baupost doesn’t go short because, unlike going long when you can take advantage of a drop in the value of an undervalued security by just buying more, if you're short even though you may be right that it’s worth less then the trading price you can still go broke. It’s way more risky and you can lose to infinity. Think tech stocks - if you shorted them in '97, '98 or even '99 you would have been killed. It works for a while, and then the market goes berserk and you get killed.
Baupost uses hedges to reduce risk. For example, they use derivatives to hedge the interest rate risk in their real estate holdings. They hold credit default swaps on the government debt of countries they have investments in (S. Korea). They also hold credit default swaps in a bunch of European countries not necessarily because they have holdings there but because it reduces risk and they were very cheap ($60, 000 a year for $100 million in insurance).
Baupost does best when there is high uncertainty and little information. When they research a company they do what ever they can to find information; they talk to every one to get information including management, industry people, former executives, customers, suppliers, they sometimes hire consultants and talk to analysts on buy and sell side.
They constantly reassess to find new information, if they’ve overlooked something or if something has changed.
Employees own the second largest position in Baupost.
Baupost’s 3 investment principles:
1. Focus on risk before return. This is why Baupost has so much cash, currently 45% of the fund is in cash. If they could find undervalued investments they would put all their money to work tomorrow. If they had to they would have no problem holding 100% cash. People fail to have sell discipline because they can’t hold cash.
2. Focus on absolute returns. Institutions focus on relative returns but Baupost doesn’t because Klarman can’t imagine writing a letter to clients saying "we performed well during the year, the market was down 25% and we were down only 20%" also clients will pull money out at the wrong time and it has a strong psychological effect.
3. Only focus on bottom up investing. He has views on the macro but doesn’t think he has an edge in that type of investing. Klarman said that it’s really hard to turn a macro idea into an investment.
Klarman's 5 fold investment in Enron debt
Baupost invested in Enron’s senior debt and he said that would be an example of his favorite type of investment. The situation had a lot of complexity, hard to analyze, a lot of litigation, uncertainty and no one wanted to be associated with anything Enron creating a huge mispricing. Baupost bought the debt for 10-15 cents on the dollar. It comes down to assessing assets minus liabilities. After a few years most of Enron’s assets were cash $16-18 billion but the liabilities were extremely complicated, with over 1,000 subsidiaries. Baupost had one analyst focus solely on Enron for over 4 years and try to figure out its liabilities and how much they would get back on the bonds. Baupost believed that the people liquidating Enron were low balling what they would get back on the bonds. The people liquidating Enron were very pessimistic and they originally estimated that the bonds would get back 17 cents on the dollar at the same time the debt traded for 14-15 cents, Baupost estimated that the debt would recover 30-40 cents and as of now they believe it will be more then 50 cents.
Investments like Enron debt are possible because the market doesn’t assess risk correctly by relying on volatility (beta).
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Buying High (for example MEE)
Please MEE's recent stock trend, pull back and back up for the buying high!
Buying HighPosted By:Carlo DellaversonTopics:Stock Picks Stock MarketOne of the easiest ways Cramer uses to identify potential picks is simply by watching the new high list every day. Stocks on that list – the highest of the high – have something going for them or else they wouldn’t be there. Either they’re part of a major bull market, or the individual stocks themselves have serious momentum.
Most of the stocks on the new high list keep going higher unless something radical changes. But Cramer doesn’t just pluck names of the list thinking they will keep going up. Instead, he likes to wait for a stock to pull back from the new high list. This gives a good, lower-priced entry point in a stock that’s probably going to rebound.
But you need to be confident the stock that pulled back is going to make a comeback, Cramer stresses. Sometimes stocks pull back for good reason because a company is troubled and investors think it’s going down. But more often than not, stocks pull back from their highs because of profit-taking or some kind of panic in the market. As long as the company’s fundamental picture doesn’t change, the stock probably hasn’t fallen from grace. The fundamentals must be intact, or this method won’t help a bit, Cramer says.
Bottom Line: Look for stocks that have pulled back from the new high list – that’s the first method to Cramer’s madness, and where some of his best picks have come from.
Buying HighPosted By:Carlo DellaversonTopics:Stock Picks Stock MarketOne of the easiest ways Cramer uses to identify potential picks is simply by watching the new high list every day. Stocks on that list – the highest of the high – have something going for them or else they wouldn’t be there. Either they’re part of a major bull market, or the individual stocks themselves have serious momentum.
Most of the stocks on the new high list keep going higher unless something radical changes. But Cramer doesn’t just pluck names of the list thinking they will keep going up. Instead, he likes to wait for a stock to pull back from the new high list. This gives a good, lower-priced entry point in a stock that’s probably going to rebound.
But you need to be confident the stock that pulled back is going to make a comeback, Cramer stresses. Sometimes stocks pull back for good reason because a company is troubled and investors think it’s going down. But more often than not, stocks pull back from their highs because of profit-taking or some kind of panic in the market. As long as the company’s fundamental picture doesn’t change, the stock probably hasn’t fallen from grace. The fundamentals must be intact, or this method won’t help a bit, Cramer says.
Bottom Line: Look for stocks that have pulled back from the new high list – that’s the first method to Cramer’s madness, and where some of his best picks have come from.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)